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S
ome of the nation’s leading econo-
mists are concerned about the
safety and soundness of twin 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
There are two frequently asked ques-
tions on this topic: Who are Fannie and
Freddie? And then: Who cares?
Casual listeners of National Public
Radio might recognize Fannie Mae as
the top-of-the-hour sponsor that’s “in
the American dream business.” The
spots don’t mention that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac happen to be among
the largest (among the top five in assets)
and most profitable companies in the
country.
As you can imagine, these firms carry
a lot of political clout. They credibly
argue that their activities result in lower
mortgage rates. They have also spent
much of the last decade asserting that
the chances they might need a govern-
ment bailout are way, way down the list
of doomsday financial calamity scenar-
ios. Alot of people think they’re right.
Invisible to most Americans, the
high-stakes battle over the future of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has
arrived at an important moment.
Lawmakers are proposing bills that may
fundamentally change the way these
“government-sponsored enterprises,”
or GSEs, operate. Over the past decade,
both camps have unleashed a flurry of
research studies that alternately play up
or play down the risks and benefits of
Fannie and Freddie.
On one side are economists, free-
market champions as well as some
financial companies that might gain if
the housing GSEs were forcibly down-
sized. The U.S. Treasury and the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors have also
taken strong positions in favor of GSE
reform. These critics find objectionable
the breathtaking growth of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. The companies are
owned by private shareholders but their
debt is viewed by the market as implic-
itly backed by the U.S. government. The
way detractors see it, that’s a recipe for
moral hazard. Investors can reap profits
as long as things are going well. But
their ability to borrow at low rates
allows them to dominate their markets
and accumulate large concentrations of
risk, and if there is a downturn, ulti-
mately taxpayers are on the hook. The
firms are so big that their crashes could
cause ripple effects throughout the
entire economy. Their debt together
totals more than $1.7 trillion, about the
same amount of assets held in the 1980s
by the savings and loan industry, whose
taxpayer bailout totaled $150 billion.
On the other side are Fannie and
Freddie and virtually the entire U.S.
housing industry, including mortgage
lenders, investment banks (which
underwrite the GSEs’ substantial debt
offerings), home builders, and real
estate brokers. All assert that the
advantages shared by the housing GSEs
serve a wider cause: Fannie and Freddie
help reduce the cost of housing for
everybody. Without them, homeowner-
ship would be an unreachable dream for
scores of Americans, the story goes.
At its center, the debate boils down
to matters of principle and potential
peril. Economists like Dwight Jaffee at
the University of California at Berkeley,
find the principle of housing GSEs dis-
agreeable at best, perilous at worst. “I
do believe that there is an extremely
serious systemic risk,” Jaffee says. “In
our lifetime, if we don’t change the sys-
tem, there will be a day when Fannie
and Freddie are in trouble.”
Truth be told, there is broad agree-
ment among economists that the
housing GSEs are flawed — they are
inefficient ways to subsidize the U.S.
housing market and they pose signifi-
cant risks to the economy. Fixing them
simply makes economic sense. But real
reform will require overcoming argu-
ments like those of Princeton
University economist Alan Blinder,
whose hard-to-argue-with position is,
basically, we could do a lot worse. 
“At least with the GSEs, we get some-
thing. We created a very liquid, very
efficient market which didn’t exist
before,” says Blinder, a former Fed
Governor, who has since conducted
research sponsored by Fannie Mae. “If I
fall asleep worrying about financial
risks, it’s not Fannie and Freddie. There
are many things that come ahead.”
Wall Street Darlings
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the
respective nicknames of the Federal
National Mortgage Association and the
Federal Home Mortgage Corp. Fannie
was created in 1938 by the Federal
Housing Authority and Freddie in 1970
by Congress. Both were later converted
to private corporations and now
investors can buy shares in the compa-
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remain intact.
Today Fannie and Freddie are very
similar in business profile: Together
they dominate the secondary mortgage
market. This is where “primary” mort-
gage lenders — like banks and other
originators — sell the loans they’ve
made to home buyers. By selling their
loans, they get back cash or other cur-
rency and thus can turn around and
make more loans.
The GSEs do one of two things with
their purchased mortgages. First, they
bundle them up into securities and sell
them to investors. These securities are
backed by the mortgages that the GSEs
have bought, hence the name “mort-
gage-backed securities.” Investors
receive payment of interest and princi-
pal on the underlying mortgages, and
Fannie and Freddie reap an annual
“guarantee fee” of about 20 basis points.
As economists W. Scott Frame of the
Atlanta Fed and Lawrence White of
New York University explain it in a
working paper, “In essence, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are providing insur-
ance to holders of mortgage-backed
securities.” 
The second thing Fannie and Freddie
do with purchased mortgages — either
ones they’ve bought directly from
mortgage originators or else picked up
in the form of securities on the open
market — is keep them on their books.
In this case, they directly collect princi-
pal and interest payments. They are
able to fund their portfolio purchases
primarily by issuing enormous sums of
debt. (As of this summer, about 95 per-
cent of Fannie’s and Freddie’s assets
were reported as funded with debt.)
These retained portfolios, much more
so than the securitization business, are
red flags for economists because all that
risk sits squarely on the GSE balance
sheets.
The housing GSEs make money in
large part because they’re not like other
companies. Their special features
include: 1) exemption from state and
local income taxes; 2) a direct line of
credit with the U.S. Treasury for up to
$2.25 billion; and 3) a release from many
state investor protection laws.
Most important, their charters lend a
“halo of government support.” That is,
investors assume that when Fannie and
Freddie borrow, their debt will ulti-
mately be backed by the federal
government. Thanks to this assump-
tion, Fannie and Freddie enjoy an
approximately 40 basis point funding
advantage over firms of similar size and
with similar risk characteristics, accord-
ing to the most widely cited studies.
Nowhere can you find a written state-
ment that if Fannie or Freddie were to
fail, the government would jump in.
Fannie and Freddie themselves declare
that the government does not back their
debt. Just the same, investors assume
that the government wouldn’t let Fannie
and Freddie collapse. They’re probably
right. The savings and loan bailout is the
most widely named precedent, but a
more proper citation is that of the Farm
Credit System, a bona fide government-
sponsored enterprise to which
lawmakers offered $4 billion to save in
1987. Indeed, Fannie Mae itself was
granted special tax relief when it experi-
enced financial difficulties in the 1980s.
Far from being failures, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac arguably have been the
Wall Street success story of the past 15
years. In 1990, the two brought in com-
bined profits of $1.6 billion. By 2004,
earnings had soared to almost $13 bil-
lion. Their assets enjoyed similar
growth — from a combined $174 billion
in 1990 to more than $1.8 trillion in
2004. Stock in each firm has quadru-
pled in value over the past 15 years.
Most of the growth is attributable to
bulking up their retained mortgage
portfolios, the business that stays on
their balance sheets instead of being
sold to investors. Today, Fannie and
Freddie together hold about one-fifth
of all U.S. home mortgages and mort-
gage-backed securities in these retained
portfolios.
Analysts say that 1990 was the
approximate point when Fannie and
Freddie recognized the profit-maximiz-
ing strategy of growing their retained
portfolios. Whereas the average guar-
antee fee for issuing mortgage-backed
securities is 20 percent, the average
spread between interest rates earned on
mortgage assets and the interest costs
of funding those liabilities is between
172 and 186 basis points. Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac now earn about 85
percent of their profits and revenues
from their retained portfolios.
“Opportunity knocked and they
answered,” Jaffee says.
The “Principle” Objection
There is a whole school of would-be
reformers who want to yank govern-
ment ties from Fannie and Freddie for
the simple reason that they think there
is no need to subsidize the housing
market. In the United States, home-
ownership stands at 69 percent — well
above any other developed country.
There is no market failure here and 
so there should be no subsidy, their
logic goes.
At the same time, some economists
— and many politicians — believe that
the more homeownership, the better.
Homeownership is thought to produce
positive “externalities” of making good
citizens and good neighborhoods. Thus,
even a 69 percent homeownership rate
should be improved upon.
But are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
really the most efficient way to pro-
mote homeownership? That 40 basis
point funding advantage is supposed to
trickle down into reduced borrowing
rates for residential loans. How much of
it actually trickles down is one of the
biggest sticking points in the “princi-
ple” debate over Fannie and Freddie.
Wayne Passmore, an economist at
the Federal Reserve Board, takes one of
the more skeptical views. In a series of
papers he comes up with seven basis
points for the amount of the GSE sub-
sidy that gets passed on to consumers.
In other words, mortgage rates are 0.07
percentage point lower thanks to
Fannie and Freddie. The other 33 basis
points, Passmore concludes, end up in
the pockets of GSE shareholders.
Looking at Passmore’s findings, it’s as
if the GSEs have been issued a govern-
ment-backed credit card and gone on a
spending binge. Fannie and Freddie
shareholders have been enriched, tax-
payers endangered, and the net result to
homeowners, has been trivial. Seven
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cient to influence homeownership in
the aggregate; in a 2002 study, econo-
mists at the Minneapolis Fed concluded
that 200 basis points are needed to
influence home buying trends.
AFannie Mae spokesman declined to
comment on a series of questions.
Freddie Mac did not return several
phone messages seeking comment.
Fannie and Freddie managers defend-
ed their turf before Congress in April.
“Fannie Mae has drawn in billions of
dollars from investors abroad to expand
the availability and lower the cost of
housing for low- and moderate-income
Americans,” Daniel Mudd, interim
CEO with Fannie Mae, told the U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. In written
testimony, Freddie Mac CEO Richard
Syron (who served as president of the
Boston Fed from 1989 to 1994) said:
“The housing GSEs have attracted
global capital, created new mortgage
tools, and served as a shock absorber
when the broader financial markets
locked up. As a result, housing today is
less vulnerable to the business cycle
than ever before.” 
Perhaps. It’s important to keep in
mind, though, that foreign capital has
been pouring into many sectors of the
U.S. economy, not just the housing mar-
ket. Fannie’s and Freddie’s portfolios
arguably have grown because foreign
investors believe they are subject to
implicit federal protection and are
therefore especially safe places to
invest. Other than that, there is no rea-
son why these companies should have a
special ability to attract foreign capital.  
In a study commissioned to address
Passmore’s findings, economist Blinder
and two co-authors said their research
shows that 25 to 30 basis points of the
implicit subsidy get passed on to con-
sumers — not seven basis points.
“That’s a world of difference,” Blinder
says. And to him, it justifies the contin-
ued government-backing of Fannie and
Freddie.
The “Peril” Objection
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are super-
vised by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, or OFHEO,
which is part of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
OFHEO’s chief job is enforcing GSE
capital requirements. The legislation
that created OFHEO also dictates that
HUD each year establish the percent-
age of loans that the GSEs must buy
from low- and moderate-income plus
urban home buyers. (Another key way
the GSEs target affordable housing is
by virtue of the limits of the size of
mortgages they can buy. In 2005, the
limit was $359,650. Anything bigger
than that is termed a “jumbo” mortgage
and only private firms can buy them in
the secondary market. Of course, the
vast majority of loans that fall below the
jumbo limit do not go to low-income
home buyers.)
OFHEO is among those supporting
reform of the housing GSEs. The office
wants increased powers consistent with
what bank regulators have, such as
strengthened capital powers, enforce-
ment authorities, and the power of
receivership. Patrick Lawler, chief
economist with OFHEO, grants that
the odds of Fannie and Freddie actually
causing a systemic problem to the econ-
omy are remote, but adds, “A remote
possibility with very large consequences
is important to consider.”
What worries examiners at OFHEO
is the GSE Achilles’ heel: interest-rate
risk. If rates suddenly decline, home-
owners are more likely to refinance
their mortgages, in which case Fannie
and Freddie would be making debt pay-
ments at rates higher than the returns
they would be collecting from newly
acquired mortgages. Conversely, a rapid
rise in rates would mean the GSEs
would be taking on new debt at rates
higher than the returns they’d be raking
in from their retained mortgages.
Lawrence White of New York
University, describes it this way: “They
generally do what they do well — but
there is the possibility that something
could go wrong.”
Fannie and Freddie and their defend-
ers point out that modern-day financial
vehicles like derivatives offer protec-
tion from rate swings. The GSEs are
among the biggest users of derivatives
like interest-rate swaps and related
transactions — and they maintain that
they are among the best at it. But
hedges like these aren’t perfect. And
more to the point, some studies have
found that Fannie and Freddie aren’t
even trying to come close to perfectly
hedging their interest rate risks because
to do so would hurt profits. By Jaffee’s
count, the GSEs would give up at least
$1 billion in profits if they were to fully
hedge their interest rate risks.
Economists like Jaffee have been
sounding alarms about the housing
GSEs for years to no effect. It wasn’t
until this past year that reform efforts
finally gained traction. Accounting
scandals hit Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae in 2003 and 2004, respectively,
making the firms suddenly vulnerable.
Both firms were found to be improper-
ly accounting for their interest rate
hedges and had to restate earnings
down by $9 billion in Fannie Mae’s case
and up by $5 billion in Freddie Mac’s.
Now, reformers can basically be
grouped into three camps: those want-
ing to keep the GSEs intact with a
stronger regulator; those pushing for
strict limits on their retained portfolios;
and those aiming for full privatization.
The “mini” reform crowd includes
members of the housing industry. “We
do believe they play an important role,
particularly in the provision of liquidity
through the securitization process,”
says Doug Duncan, chief economist
with the Mortgage Bankers
Association. As a purely descriptive
matter, this is surely true. But many
economists doubt whether Fannie and
Freddie are now essential to a well-func-
tioning secondary mortgage market. In
their absence, private firms would likely
step in and provide similar services.   
Duncan’s group supports the cre-
ation of an “independent, well-funded
regulator, very much bank-like.” Fannie
and Freddie officers have testified
before Congress that they would sup-
port the establishment of a new
regulator with expanded powers to
rewrite risk-based capital standards and
place troubled GSEs into receivership.
They don’t want detailed statutes that
spell out what the GSEs can and 
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don’t want restrictions on their mort-
gage portfolios. Freddie Mac CEO
Syron, in prepared remarks before the
Senate in April, said: “For Freddie Mac
to continue fulfilling its mission, there
is a very real limit to how far the restric-
tions on us can be increased — and our
abilities diminished.”
Clamping Down
The next tier of those pushing for over-
haul call for dramatic curtailments in
the GSEs’ mortgage portfolios — the
combined $1.5 trillion sitting on Fannie
and Freddie balance sheets that consti-
tute the interest rate risks. Those in
favor of this approach, including the
Federal Reserve Board and the U.S.
Treasury, focus on that part of GSE
activity with the greatest potential for
systemic risk and taxpayer loss – the
companies’ ability to borrow at subsi-
dized rates and build large exposures to
interest rate swings through their port-
folio holdings.
Fannie and Freddie are especially
opposed to this idea. They argue that
forcing them to cull their mortgage
portfolios would hurt U.S. home buy-
ers. They say that foreign investors in
particular are attracted to GSE debt —
but wouldn’t be so enamored with fully
private-sector alternatives, thus reduc-
ing overall liquidity in the U.S.
mortgage market. (But any such special
characteristics of GSE debt come only
from their special status and their
implicit subsidy, and foreign invest-
ment in a wide array of U.S. assets has
shown healthy growth since the late
1990s.) Finally, Fannie and Freddie say
that profits from their portfolios sup-
port affordable housing activities, and
that their interest rate risks are no
worse (and perhaps better) than those
faced by the largest U.S. banks. Recent
accounting problems associated with
their use of derivatives (for risk-man-
agement) at the very least call this
assertion into question. 
The case for limiting portfolio size is
strong, though, and was summed up by
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan in his
testimony before the Senate in April.
“We have been unable to find any pur-
pose for the huge balance sheets of the
GSEs, other than profit creation
through the exploitation of the market-
granted subsidy,” he said. “As far as we
can tell, GSE mortgage securitization,
in contrast to the GSEs’ portfolio hold-
ings, is the key ingredient to
maintaining and enhancing the bene-
fits of the GSEs to home buyers. And
mortgage securitization, unlike the
GSEs’ portfolio holdings, does not cre-
ate substantial systemic risks.”
Time to Cut Ties?
Privatization is the goal of the third tier
of reformers. In a June 2005 paper, the
Heritage Foundation, a Washington
think tank, summed up its case this way:
“Congress has an opportunity to reduce
financial market risk and taxpayer expo-
sure and to restore competition in the
residential mortgage market. At the
same time, the housing industry and
homeownership opportunity will
remain unaffected.”
Short term, privatization would be
both logistically difficult to achieve and
bad for shareholders in Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. But it could also allow the
GSEs to get into new businesses, such
as making loans to home buyers, now
the exclusive domain of primary market
mortgage lenders, for example.
On this possibility, housing industry
participants are united in opposition:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must be
confined to their own business; there
should be a “bright line” between
allowed and forbidden endeavors.
“There’s no question we have strong
feelings what their charter empowers
them to do,” says Duncan of the
Mortgage Bankers Association.
In fact, the housing GSEs have
already made several forays into nonsec-
ondary market activities. As detailed by
the American Enterprise Institute,
another Washington-based think tank,
these forays include: expanding pur-
chases of home equity loans; lending to
luxury apartment developers; and mar-
keting appraisal, title insurance and
full-service insurance agency services.
Additionally, both Fannie and Freddie
are believed to be eyeing the consumer
lending market. It is thus contrary to
the interests of many in the housing
industry to support broad GSE reform.
On the flip side? In the end, even a
massive bailout wouldn’t be likely to
directly cost taxpayers very much on a
per-capita basis. So a Congress interest-
ed in promoting homeownership while
protecting the economy faces mixed
incentives. In a July research note about
the possibility of new mandates forcing
the GSEs to curtail their portfolios,
Morgan Stanley analyst Kenneth Posner
said, “We do not foresee Congress
agreeing on such an extreme piece of
legislation.”
That might be true. But it doesn’t
make the case for reform any less 
compelling. “This is a bad way to sup-
plement low-income housing,” says
Jaffee. RF
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